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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
vs.
Case No.

900158 CA

MICHAEL STEWARD,
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of right made pursuant to Title 77, Part
35, Section 26 of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

This court has appellate jurisdiction in

this case pursuant to Title 28, Part 2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah
Code.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of the
third degree felony offenses of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute entered in the
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County following a
bench trial before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District
Judge.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether

it violates the

fourth amendment to the United

States Constitution to intercept all traffic entering a street
where homes are being searched for drugs pursuant to warrants, to
detain for questioning all persons who give a searched home as
their destination, and to search all persons so detained and
their vehicles for weapons•

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The

fourth

amendment

to the United

States

Constitution

provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The appellant, Michael Steward, was charged by information
with the third degree felonies of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute and simple possession of methamphetamine in
violation of Section 58-37-1(a)(i),(iv), Utah Code.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition
Prior to trial, appellant made a motion "to suppress any
evidence seized from the defendant as a result of the stop of the
defendant's vehicle and the search of said vehicle."

(R-13).

An

evidentiary hearing was held at which the defendant argued that
the detention of the appellant and the subsequent searches and
seizures

violated

unreasonable

appellantfs

searches

Suppress Hearing,

and

right

seizures

to

be

(Transcript,

court

against

Motion

to

[hereinafter cited as "MT"] at 47, 48) as

guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
district

secure

denied

that

motion

and

(MT 52).

entered

The

Findings,

Conclusions and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress (R20) .
The matter was tried to the bench without jury.1
1

The

There is no waiver of right to jury in the trial
transcript but a minute entry (R-15) shows that the defendant
waived his right to jury at the pre-trial conference.
3

defendant's motion to suppress was renewed and his objection
overruled (TT-83) and evidence that 0.24 grams of methamphetamine
(TT-76) and $5,257.00 in cash

(TT-30, 62) were found on his

person and 7.2 ounces of marijuana were found in his vehicle was
admitted.

(TT-89).

Based on that evidence, the court found the

defendant guilty of both counts.

(Transcript, Trial, January 26,

1990, 1:30 p.m. at 10-11).
The defendant was fined and his prison sentence suspended on
the condition, among others, that he serve a year in jail.
31, 33) .

(R-

This court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and

stayed the jail term and payment of the fine pending appeal.
other conditions of probation remain in effect.

The

(R-52).

Relevant Facts
On August 20, 1989, a joint task force of federal and local
law

enforcement

methamphetamine

officers

executed

search

laboratory and controlled

warrants

for

a

substances on three

homes on a dead-end street in Copperton, Utah.

The Salt Lake

City

Tactics

Police

Department

Special

Weapons

and

Team

(S.W.A.T. Team) was assigned to make entry and secure one of the
homes.

(Transcript, Motion to Suppress Hearing, January 2, 1990

[hereinafter "MT"] at 4, 6). A handgun was located in the home
searched by the S.W.A.T. team and other weapons were found in the
4

other homes searched.

(MT-11).

After, securing the home and turning it over to narcotics
officers for the detailed search, the S.W.A.T. team took up a
position at the entrance of the street to intercept entering
traffic.

The street was approximately 150 yards long with six to

eight homes on it.

(MT-7) .

One of the homes targeted in the

warrants was located by the entrance to the dead-end street; the
two others were at its end.

(Transcript, Trial, January 26,

1990, 10:00 a.m. [hereinafter "TT"] at 16). There were over ten
police vehicles involved in the searches causing some congestion
on the street.

(MT-22).

According to a plan formulated before the searches began,
(MT-25) the S.W.A.T. team was to stop all vehicles entering the
street and determine their destination.

(MT-8).

Anybody who was

going to one of the targeted homes was to be detained to be
questioned by narcotics officers.

(MT-9, 24).

All persons so

detained would have their vehicles and persons searched
weapons.

(TT-17-19, 41).

Persons

going

to

other

for

than the

targeted homes would be directed where to park and escorted to
their destination. (MT-9).2

z

The record does not disclose how many vehicles were
stopped during the course of the operation but there is an
indication that at least two persons other than appellant were
detained for questioning by narcotics officers. (MT-60).
5

The S.W.A.T. team was composed of at least four, and
probably more, officers dressed in green, military style uniforms
with police patches on their shoulders and hats.
street was not barricaded or blocked off.

(TT-14).

(TT-14).

The

Instead, the

team concealed itself in the shadows and, when a car pulled into
the street, stepped out and signaled it to stop.

(MT-20).

At 11:50 p.m., one hour and twenty minutes after the search
of the homes began, (MT-22) the appellant, driving a pick-up
truck, turned into the street.

(MT-12).

stepped out and waved at him to stop.

The S.W.A.T. team

The appellant "stopped the

vehicle, and then put the vehicle in reverse as if to back out."3
(MT-12).

The truck "just barely started to move backward," (TT-

16, 17), and travelled a foot or two.

(TT-17) .

An officer

opened the driver's door, identified himself as an officer and
told appellant to stop, which he did.

(MT-12, 21).

The appellant was asked his destination and responded that
he was going to a house at the end of the street.
ordered

out

of the truck

and

questioned

He was

further as to his

destination and it was determined that he was going to Bailey's
house, one of the houses being searched.

J

At that point, the

The officer who testified thusly, later conceded on
cross-examination that the vehicle may have been in neutral and
rolled back as a result of the grade in the road.
(TT-16,
17)(Quoted infra at 26).
6

officers

"patted

down"

vehicle for weapons.

appellant's

(MT-15).

person

and

searched

the

During the search, a quantity of

marijuana and numerous empty sandwich "baggies" were discovered
in a gym bag on the floor in front of the passenger seat.

(MT-

15) .
The S.W.A.T. team alerted the narcotics officers by radio,
and one of them came to the scene and placed the appellant under
arrest.

(MT-42).

truck, was

The appellant's jacket, which was in the

searched

before

being

returned

to him

and

four

thousand dollars in cash and a paper bindle containing a small
amount of white powder were found.

(MT-43).

In a more thorough

search of appellant's person, more than twelve hundred dollars
in cash was found in his pants pocket.
At trial it was established that there were 201 grams (7.2
ounces) of marijuana

in the gym bag.

(TT-57) .

An officer

testified that in his opinion the amount of marijuana, the empty
baggies and the large amount of cash indicated that the marijuana
was possessed with intent to distribute.

(TT-45).

A state

chemist testified that the paper bundle contained 0.24 grams of
methamphetamine.

Without the evidence seized in the challenged

searches neither conviction would stand.

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
BECAUSE THE OFFICERS LACKED AUTHORITY
FOR
THE
INITIAL
STOP THE
SUBSEQUENT
DETENTIONS AND SEARCHES WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY
INVALID.
(A)

The trial court erred in concluding that the seizure

did not occur until after the appellant was ordered out of his
truck.

A "seizure" as that term is used in the fourth amendment

occurs whenever authority is used to stop a vehicle and the
justification for the assertion of authority must be determined
upon the facts known to the officer at the time the authority is
asserted.
suspicion

The officers lacked the reasonable and
that

a

crime

had

occurred

or

was

articulable

about

to

occur

necessary to justify a stop of appellant in the first instance
and

his

reaiction to their

order to stop

and the

information

acquired after the seizure of appellant cannot be used to justify
the initial seizure.
(B)

Justification other then reasonable suspicion for the

initial stop was neither argued nor considered by the district
court and should not be raised upon appeal.

Alternatively, the

manner in which the check point was conducted maximized rather
than minimized the fear and anxiety inflicted upon the innocent
citizens

who

entered

it

and

could

reasonable exercise of police power.
8

not

be

justified

as

a

II. ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL
SEIZURE THE FURTHER DETENTION AND SEARCHES OF
APPELLANT AND HIS VEHICLE WERE INVALID.
The appellant was detained and searched pursuant to orders
to detain and search for weapons all persons who gave as a
destination one of the homes being searched pursuant to warrant,
not because of his reaction when he was stopped.
The conclusion of the district court that the appellant
attempted to flee is not supported by the evidence.
The totality of the circumstances did not raise a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the further detention
or raise a reasonable belief that appellant was armed to justify
a search for weapons.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE OFFICERS LACKED JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE INITIAL STOP.
(A) The district court's legal conclusion in denying the
motion to suppress that "such a temporary seizure occurred when
defendant was required to exit his truck by the police officers."
(Conclusion of Law No. 2, R-22) is clearly erroneous.
As this Court has held:
The fourth amendment applies to brief
investigation stops that fall short of
official traditional arrests. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968). The stopping of an
9

automobile and the consequent detention of
its occupants constitute a "seizure" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment, despite
the fact that the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite
brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649, 653
(1979); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123
(Utah 1983).
State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d

972, 975

(Utah App. 1988).

The

defendant was not ordered out of his vehicle until after he was
stopped and it was determined that he was going to one of the
houses being searched.
modified

this

(MT-15).

conclusion

in

The district court may have
its

Summary

Decision

on

the

appellant's application for a certificate of probable cause where
it acknowledged that the information acquired from the appellant
after the stop could not be used to justify the initial stop.
(R-46, 47) .

The district court did, however, reiterate at that

time its reliance upon the appellant's reaction to the officers'
signal to stop. (Ibid.)
The difficulty with the district court's analysis is that it
is bootstrapping

justification

of the officers' authority to

order a stop with the suspect's reaction to that authority which
is no different than justifying a stop by observations made as a
result of the stop which is clearly not permissible.
v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988).

E.g., State

In State v. Talbot,

134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (May 9, 1990) this court, in holding that
flight alone did not raise enough reasonable suspicion of
10

criminal activity to justify a stop, observed it did not suggest
that flight must be entirely ignored,
13.

114 Utah Adv. Rep. at n.

However, in that case the legality of the roadblock which

apparently initiated the flight was not challenged on appeal nor
considered by the court.

113 Utah Adv. Rep. at n. 4.

Appellant

here is challenging the officers1 authority to order him to stop
in the first instance.

This court in dictum in State v. Talbot,

supraP at 19, n. 6, pointed out the fallacy in using a failure to
stop in response to a police signal as justification for the
stop:
[I]t constitutes circular
reasoning to suggest that police may use the
subsequent
failure to stop as the
justification for a search and seizure which
would have been unlawful had the defendant
complied with the order to stop. Though we
in no way encourage citizens to be their own
judges about whether or not they are
obligated to stop when ordered to do so by
police, neither do we wish to encourage
police to act on their hunches, signal a
citizen to stop in the hope that the citizen
will refuse, and use the failure to stop as a
post facto justification for a stop which is
otherwise without legal basis.
At the time the officers1 asserted their authority to stop
the appellant, the only facts they knew were that the appellant's
vehicle, at 11:50 p.m., was entering a dead-end street where
three out of the six or eight homes there were being searched for
an illegal laboratory and controlled substances and some general
11

information that trucks and vans are sometimes used to transport
materials

to

laboratories

and

customers

and

distributors

frequently use late hours to make purchases from laboratories.4
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 Sup. Ct. 2637, 61
L.Ed.2d. 357 (1979), the United States Supreme Court dealt with
the validity of a stop of a man seen walking away from another
man, with whom the officer believed he may have been transacting
in

drugs,

in

an

"alley

with

a

high

intensity

of

drug

trafficking".
The Court stated:
The fact that appellant was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users,
standing alone, is not a basis for concluding
that appellant himself was engaged in
criminal conduct.
99 Sup. Ct. at 2641.
Driving a pick-up truck at 11:50 p.m. into a dead-end street
where some of the homes are involved in drug activity is clearly
an activity insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that the
driver was involved in criminal activity which is required to
justify even a momentary seizure under the fourth amendment.
See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, supra? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

4

The court's Findings No. 3 says "frequently use late
evening hours." (R-21). The testimony of the narcotics officer,
however, was that no particular hour is specifically utilized and
"The peak hours are the hours of darkness". (MT-34).
12

Sup. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968), State v. Baird, supra; Davis,
Exploring the Dimensions of the "Reasonable Suspicion11 Standard,
UTAH BAR J. 8 (Oct. 1989).
(B)

The

suspicion

district

of

court

criminal

considered

activity

only

justification

the
for

reasonable
a

brief

investigatory stop which is the exception to the probable cause
requirement developed in such cases as Terry v. Ohio, supra, and
State v. Baird, supra.

The state did not advance any other

justification for the initial stop such as those set out for a
permanent immigration checkpoint in United States v.Martinez Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d. 1116 (1976), or
for a drunk driving roadblock in Michigan Dept. of State Police
v. Sitz. 58 LAW WEEK 4781 (June 14, 1990).

When appellant's new

counsel, who had not previously represented him in the district
court, attempted
justification

to analyze the stop under the "checkpoint"

law in connection with the application to the

district

court

for a certificate of probable cause, he was

rebuffed

for raising

a theory not previously

Summary Decision and Order (R-45, 47-48).

argued.

See,

Accordingly, the state

should not be allowed to advance, for the first time on appeal,
the theory that the stop was a reasonable exercise of police
power

in

suspicion.

a

"checkpoint"

situation

See, State v. Schlosser,
13

not

requiring

reasonable

774 P.2d 1132,

1138 (Utah

1989) (standing issue) ; State v, Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,
16 (Ct. App., May 8, 1990) (consent to search issue).
Alternatively, if the stop here is analyzed as a checkpoint
stop it clecirly does not meet the standards of reasonableness
required of all seizures under the fourth amendment.5

Appellant

does not contend that the police could not, in a reasonable
manner, have temporarily controlled access to the dead-end street
upon which the warrants were being executed and even limited
access to those living there or otherwise having a need of entry.
Such police control of traffic is routine at the scenes of fire
and even in the area of highly attended sporting events.
that was not what was going on in this case.

But

The police did not

station a uniformed officer with a police car and barricades or
flares

at

the

motorists could
access.

entrance

of

the

street

so

that

approaching

see that the police were merely

restricting

They were in dark, military-style uniforms rather than

the usual uniforms that people associate with traffic control,
and they concealed themselves so that approaching motorists would
not know that they were to be stopped until the S.W.A.T. team
emerged from the shadows ordering a halt.

5

The Untied States Supreme Court has only recently
reaffirmed that the fourth amendment applies to even momentary
stops of vehicles at a checkpoint.
Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 58 LAW WEEK 4781, 4783 (June 14, 1990).
14

In

United

distinguished

States
the

v.

Martinez-Fuerte,

permanent

immigration

supra,

checkpoint

the

Court

which

it

upheld as reasonable, from roving stops which it had previously
held invalid without reasonable suspicion, thusly:
But we view checkpoint stops in a
different light because the
subjective
intrusion—the generating of concern or even
fright on the part of lawful travelers—is
appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint
stop. In Ortiz, we noted:
"[T]he circumstances surrounding a
checkpoint stop and search are far
less intrusive than those attending
a roving-patrol
stop.
Roving
patrols often operate at night on
seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists.
At traffic checkpoints the motorist
can see that other vehicles are
being stopped, he can see visible
signs of the officers1 authority,
and he is much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the
intrusion."
422 U.S., at 894-895,
95 S.Ct., at 2587.

The regularized manner in which established
checkpoints are operated is visible evidence,
reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the
stops are duly authorized and believed to
serve the public interest.
428 U.S. at 559, 96 Sup. Ct. at 3083.

(Quoted in support of

roadblocks

in

for

drunk

driving

detection

State Police, supra, 58 LAW WEEK

at 4783).

Michigan

Dept.

of

Speaking of the

selective referral of some vehicles to more intensive questioning
15

and inspection at the checkpoint, the Martinez-Fuerte Court said:
Selective referral may involve some
annoyance, but is remains true that the stops
should not be frightening or offensive
because of their public and relatively
routine nature.
428 U.S. at 560; 96 Sup. Ct. at 3084.
The Court in Martinez-Fuerte compared the assurances
provided to motorists by the "visible manifestations of the field
officers1

authority

at

a

checkpoint"

to

those

provided

by

presentation of a warrant by a building inspector which assures
an occupant that the inspection is operating lawfully and within
Limits.

428 U.S. at 565, 96 Sup. Ct. at 3086.

The Court also

stated that the reasonableness of a stop at a checkpoint turns on
factors such as the method of operation which are subject to
judicial review.

Ibid.

Checkpoints that have been upheld by

state courts have

involved controls on the discretion of the officers in the field
and

fear-reducing

features

such

conspicuous display of authority.

as

advance

warning

and

See, e.g., State v. Deskins,

234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174, 1185 (1983); State v. Hilleshiem,
291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485,
479 A.2d 903, 911 (1984).6

The use of methods to reduce fear in

6

Utah appellate courts have not yet ruled upon the
validity of checkpoints and roadblocks. State v. Talbot, supra,
at n. 4. There are at least two appeals before this court, State
16

approaching motorists has been described as one of the "crucial
factors11 for a permissible operational formula by commentators
cited with approval by this court.

Davis & Wallentine, A Model

for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops
in Utah, 3 BYU J. Pub. L. 357, 379-80, (1989), cited. State v.
Talbot, supra, at n.4.
The officers in the instant case conducted themselves in
such a manner as to exacerbate rather than reduce fear and
anxiety.

Instead of giving advance and conspicuous notice of

their authority they concealed themselves in the shadows until
the moment of the stop.

The green, military-style uniforms the

officers wore are not readily recognized as police uniforms as
the officer who testified readily acknowledged:
Q
[by Prosecutor] You testified that you
tried to identify yourselves as you told the
defendant to stop.
How did you identify
yourself?
A
I just said, "Police officers," once or
twice. I said it as least twice.
v. Sims, Case No. 890463CA and State v. Kitchen, Case No.
900307CA, where organized roadblocks are being challenged on both
federal and state constitutional grounds and because the Utah
legislature, Sections 41-1-17 and 77-7-15, Utah Code, has limited
police officers1 authority to stop vehicles to where an officer
has a reasonable belief of violation of law. Appellant here does
not concede the validity of roadblocks in Utah.
However,
appellant's main point is that if roadblocks are to be upheld,
they must conform to standards which reduce the intrusion upon
constitutionally protected interests to a minimum which clearly
was not done here.
17

Q
How close in time to this time that you
are trying to tell him to stop are you saying
you are a police officer?
A
When we opened the door to the truck we
identified ourselves as police officers.
Q

What did you say?

A
We just said, "police officers. Stop."
And somebody else said, "police officers."
and we normally do that because of the
problem with identifying ourselves in the
green uniforms, because we tend to give them
several responses of officers so that they
know who we are and what's going on.
(MT-29, 30).
RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. STODDARD;
Q
From the time that you waved the
defendant to have him stop, and the time you
approached, how long was that?
A
A matter of seconds, or a couple of
seconds at the very most.
Q
You indicated there's a problem with
identifying yourself as a SWAT officer?
A
Yes. it's not the typical uniform most
people deal with, so we go out of our way to
tell people we are the police.
Q
It's been your past experience
people do get confused about it?
A

that

Yes.

(MT-31).
The manner in which this interception took place bears
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little resemblance to the organized checkpoints which have been
upheld by the courts on less than reasonable suspicion because of
their fear reducing features.

Being ambushed on a dark street by

individuals in military uniforms coming out of the shadows is an
entirely different experience

from approaching a well marked

checkpoint

officers

where

uniformed

are

obviously

merely

conversing briefly with passing motorists.
It is submitted that the initial stop was unreasonable under
any

standard

and

therefore

was

a

constitutionally

invalid

detention requiring the suppression of the evidence derived from
the following unconsented to searches.

E.g., State v. Baird,

supra.
POINT II. ASSUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE
INITIAL SEIZURE THE FURTHER DETENTION AND
SEARCHES OF APPELLANT AND HIS VEHICLE WERE
INVALID.
For

purposes

of

this

argument

it

is assumed

that the

officers acted lawfully in stopping all persons turning into the
dead-end street and determining their destinations.

The further

detention for questioning by narcotics officers of all persons
going to any of the homes being searched and the searching of
their persons for weapons constituted unreasonable searches and
seizures

under

the

fourth

amendment

Constitution.
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to

the

United

States

The district court concluded that reasonable and articulable
suspicion to justify the detention was based upon the combination
of facts that:

(1) the appellant approached the area in a pick-

up truck which vehicle was consistent with those types used to
deliver chemicals and supplies to a drug laboratory.7

(2) the

late hour which is the time of choice for customers of drug
dealers.8

(3) the appellant's attempt to flee the presence of

the officers.

(Conclusion 2, R-22).

The district court also

concluded:
That the evidence of guns other weapons
habitually associated with drug dealers and
the presence of weapons actually found during
the searches of the houses in the area
provided a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the defendant may be armed and
thus justified the pat-down search of
defendant's person and the cursory search of
his truck for weapons.
Conclusion 3, (R-22).
It is clear from the testimony of the officers that the
appellant was further detained and searched because he told the
1

A narcotics officer testified that the "number one
transporters" used to deliver supplies to drug laboratories are
vans.
Only when specifically and leadingly asked by the
prosecutor, did he agree that pick-up trucks are also used. (MT36) .
8

The testimony of the narcotics officer about the
"coming and going on at hours suspected of drug dealers" is that
it does not occur at any specific hour:
"It can occur at any
where from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The peak hours are the hours
of darkness, it seems." (MT-34).
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officers he was going to one of the homes being searched and a
decision had been made, prior to the beginning of the search of
the homes, to detain all persons headed for the homes and to
search all persons so detained for weapons.
Q
[Defense Counsel]
So was this your
policy to do this all the time, search all
vehicles?
A
[Sergeant Adair]
Any vehicles that
were going to those houses, or had anything
to do with those houses, we were asked by the
narcotics officers to detain them and notify
them so they could talk with them.
Our policy is to, if we are going to
deal with them for any time, we will pat them
down and make sure there are no weapons or
any threats.
Q
Was this a normal policy, or was this a
one-time policy?
A
No.
teams.

That is the policy for the SWAT

Q
So you know when you started this raid
that you would be patting down and searching
people who were coming into the premises?
A

Yes.

(MT-24, 25).
The prosecutor made a valiant effort to induce testimony
that the further detention of the defendant was based upon the
defendant's individual reaction to the stop and his appearance
without notable success:
Q

[prosecutor]

Okay.

Let me go then

specifically to about 11:55 p.m.
On that
occasion did you have an opportunity to see
a pickup truck or have a pickup truck
approach this roadblock?
A

[Sergeant Adair]

Yes.

Q
What were the circumstances
did you observe?

and what

A
We were standing at the entrance to
road, and the pickup truck pulled into
entrance of the road.
We approached
vehicle, and as we approached we waved at
to stop.

the
the
the
him

He stopped the vehicle, and then put the
vehicle in reverse as if to back out. About
that time Sergeant Winkler opened the door to
the vehicle and told him to just stop the
vehicle, and we identified ourselves as
police officers.
Q
You say the car approached you, then
tried to back out. How close to the car were
you when the car tried to back out?
A
Oh, just a few feet, probably.
four feet.

Three or

Q
Was that done fairly slowly or fairly
abruptly?
A

It was pretty abrupt.

Q
Were you able to see the driver at that
time?
A

Yes.

Q

What was the lighting like in the area?

A
There was some street lights in the
area. It was dark. It was nighttime, but
there were some street lights, so the
lighting was fairly good.
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Q
Could you see the driver's face as he
sat there?
A

Yes.

Q
Was there anything unusual about the
driver's face or his expression as this was
all occurring?
A
He looked kind of panicky or startled.
I don't know if it was because of our
approach and the fact that the hour, or what.
But he had kind of a panicky look on his
face.
Q
Given that information, then, why did
you pursue that car and stop it once it tried
to back out?
A
We had been asked by the Metro people to
stop anyone that pulled onto the street, just
because they were curious as to any
deliveries being made to this lab.
There was a possibility of chemicals
being delivered, or drugs being transported
to or from it.
So they asked us to stop
anyone that pulled into the street that
looked like they meant to be there, and
question them about their intent.
Q
So what happened when you stopped the
car?
A
Sergeant Winkler opened the door.
We
identified ourselves as police officers and
asked the gentleman to put the truck and step
out and walk with us, which he did.
Q

Did you ask him where he was going?

A

Yes.

Q

What did he say?
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A
He pointed up to the house. He said he
was going up to the end of the street and —
Q
Which
street?

house

was

at

the

end

of

the

A
Well, two of the houses involved in the
search warrants were at the end of the
street on the south side.
Q
Were there any houses not associated
with the search that were at the end of the
street?
A
There were some on the north side of the
street, yes.
Q
Did you distinguish with the defendant
whether he was going to one of those houses
not related or one of the houses related?
A.
Yes. I talked with him. I asked him to
get out of the truck, and I asked him, you
know, more specifically where he was headed.
And he mentioned the name Bailey, which was
one of the people involved in one of the
houses on that street that was being
searched.
Q
Was there anything unusual about the
defendant about the appearance of himself or
his vehicle at that time?
A
Not—it was—I would say that it was
somewhat unusual in his dress and attire. He
wasn't the typical person that you would run
into all the time*
Q

What do you mean by that?

A
He had long hair, a beard, he looked—
appeared to me to be maybe a motorcycle type
person, somebody that hangs out with
motorcycle gangs. I don't know. He kind of
had that appearance to him.
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Q
So what did you do after receiving the
information and seeing what you saw there at
the scene?
A
We had him step out of the truck when we
determined he was involved with the people
that were being searched on the street. We
patted him down for weapons. The officers
looked through the truck for weapons. The
SWAT officers.
During that search they
located a gym bag that had some marijuana in
it, so the. . • •
(MT-12, 15).
At the trial, the same officer gave similar testimony but
was even clearer on the point that the detention and search were
based solely upon the appellant's destination rather than his
reaction:
Q
[by Defense Counsel]
So you say you
shined your flashlight and jumped out. Did
you move rapidly or slowly?
A
We just stepped out in the roadway and
held our hands up and waved him down.
Q

Did he go past you?

A
No, he stopped about even with us.
door was pretty close to where we were.

His

Q
But you came out from his right side,
the passenger side?
A

His left side, the driver's side.

Q

You stepped out from the driver's side?

A

Correct.

Q
And this street, it goes up hill, does
it not, from the main road?
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A

Yeah, it's a slight grade.

Q

And you say he stopped?

A

Yes.

Q

He started to move backward?

A
Yes.
He put the vehicle in reserve
[sic] and just barely started to move
backward.
Q
Barely started to move backward.
you know he put it in reverse?

How do

A
Just his actions, as I recall. I think
it was an automatic and he worked the lever
and the vehicle started to make a reverse
movement.
Q
Do you know whether he just simply put
it into neutral or just started to roll back?
A
Well, I don't know. It could have been
neutral, it's hard to say on that, but he did
start to move. And when we opened the door
we asked him to put the vehicle in park and
shut it down.
Q
So as far as you know, the car started
to roll backward?
A

It started moving backward, yes.

Q

It just moved, what a foot or two?

A

Probably about that far.

Q
And he did not accelerate, gun the
engine to get out of there or anything like
that?
A

No.

Q
So Sergeant Winkler was just able to
open the door?
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A

Yes,

Q

And talk to him?

A

Yes.

Q
And at that time all you knew was that
he was going up the street?
A

Yes.

Q
That's the only thing that would concern
you?
A

Yes.

Q
And your purpose was to keep him from
anybody?
To stop people, to prevent them
from going up that street o r —
A

Yes.

Q
—just inquire whether they lived there
or in the—
A

Excuse me.

Q
Your purpose was to inquire whether they
lived on that street?
A
Yeah.
It was to determine their
business and determine whether we would let
them up the street.
Q
And on what basis would you let them up
the street?
A
If they lived in the houses that weren't
involved, then we would have had them park
the vehicle in another location nearby and
escort them to their residence.
Q

And if they're just going to there to visi

A
If they were going to visit someone
other than the houses involved, then we
27

probably would have either escorted them up
there or have them identify the people in
that house and arranged for them to get
there.
Q
And what were you going to do if they
were going to visit one of the houses
involved?
A
We'd been asked by the Metro detective
to hold on to anyone that was going to those
houses so that they could come and talk to
them and find out what their business was
there•
There were some outstanding people
that they were looking for that were involved
in the lab houses and they had hoped that
some of them might arrive while we were
there.
Q
So you had a plan ahead of time of what
you were going to do specifically if somebody
said I'm going to one of these houses?
A
We would detain them and notify the
Metro Narcotics people and have them respond
to talk to them.
Q
Do you know—what do you mean detain?
Just let them sit in their car, get them out?
A
Our normal procedure would be to—in
that situation with the type of thing we" s
dealt with on the initial entry of the
houses, we would have them step out of the
V€»hicle and search the vehicle for weapons
and pat them down for weapons and then allow
them to sit in the vehicle.
And the
narcotics detectives were just a matter of
one or two minutes away. We would just have
them remain in the vehicle until a detective
got there.
(TT-16-19).
The district court's conclusion that the appellant attempted
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to flee and this raised a suspicion in the officers mind that led
to further detention and the searches is clearly erroneous in
view of the officer's testimony9.

There is no indication in the

testimony that the officer believed the appellant was attempting
to escape or that the officer's decision was in any way

9

Appellant recognizes the rule that fl[i]n the absence of
clear error, [the court will] uphold a trial judge's factual
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a suppression
motion". State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, (Utah 1989). The court
hearing the motion is of course in the best position to evaluate
the creditability of witnesses. However, here the testimony of
the state's own witnesses simply does not support the district
court's conclusions that there was an escape attempt.
Even if the evidence had indicated that the appellant
attempted to escape, it still was not the reason the appellant
was detained.
In State v. Talbot, supra, a sheriff posse
stopped a vehicle because it appeared to evade a roadblock. The
State argued that the evidence also
showed that traffic
violations occurred which would have justified the stop (a fact
situation which is converse to the instant cases).
The court
said:
It is obvious to us from the evidence
produced at the suppression hearing that the
stop was not based at the time upon any
traffic violations but rather upon the
conclusion, however flawed, that avoidance of
the roadblock gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
It is
inconsequential that the officers could have
stopped the vehicle for one or more traffic
violations where in fact the stop was for
other reasons.
134 Utah Adv. at 17. Here, the reason for the detention and
search articulated repeatedly by the officer was that he had
orders to detain and search all persons whose destination was one
of the homes being searched.
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influenced

by

the defendant's reaction.

In

fact, from the

officer's testimony concerning a normal person's reaction to a
sudden appearance by a S.W.A.T. team in olive drab uniforms, it
is apparent that the officer believed the appellant's reaction
was not unusual.10
The issue then is whether police may lawfully detain and
search for weapons all persons who the police know to be enroute
to visit a home which is being searched, pursuant to a warrant,
for controlled substances.

(This is a different question from

whether the police could turn such visitors away while a search
is underway).
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88, S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 889
(1968), the Supreme Court held that a police officer who observed
two men engaging in conduct which raised a reasonable suspicion
they were about to rob a store acted reasonably under the fourth
amendment in detaining them and, because he reasonably believed
they were armed and dangerous, acted reasonably in "frisking"
10

There are various non-incriminating explanations for
the appellant's vehicle rolling back a foot or two. The officer
conceded it might have simply been the result of it being in
neutral (TT-17) and that the appellant appeared startled by the
manner in which he was approached (MT-12) a not unusual reaction
for an innocent person who is suddenly surrounded by dark figures
at a late hour. Or, the appellant may have been confused and
believed the officers were telling him he was not supposed to be
there.
It was the officer's experience that people have a
problem identifying the S.W.A.T. team as officers and get
confused. (MT-31).
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them for weapons.

At the outset, it should be observed that the

Terry "stop and frisk" exception to the probable cause and
warrant requirements of the fourth amendment was predicated upon
the exigent circumstances confronting an officer in a unexpected
and rapidly developing situation, for the Court stated:
We do not retreat from our holdings that
the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and
seizures through the warrant procedure,
[citations omitted] or that in most instances
failure to comply with the warrant
requirement can only be excused by exigent
circumstances.
[citations omitted] But we
deal here with an entire rubic of police
conduct—necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat—which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not
be, subjected to the warrant procedure.
88 S. Ct. at 1879, 392 U.S. at 20.
The

instant

circumstance.

case was
Before

a

the

far

cry

operation

from

such

began,

an exigent
the

police

anticipated that visitors might approach the homes during the
search and planned and executed a trap for them.

Search warrants

were obtained for the homes involved but no request was made to
the magistrate for permission to either establish a checkpoint or
detain and search all visitors.

(MT-45).

The officers1 on their

own authority simply decided, in advance, to expand the scope of
the search from the homes to all people who came into the street
to visit any of the searched homes. As argued to the district
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court, this conduct by the police constituted and impermissible
evasion of the warrant requirement.11

(TT-49).

In Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62
L.Ed.2d. 238 (1979), police executing a search warrant for heroin
upon a bar room and a named bartender frisked the patrons present
in the room for weapons locating heroin on the person of Ybarra,
a visitor, in the process.

The trial court had held the search

to be a valid search to prevent destruction of evidence under a
state statute permitting such searches.
Ct. at 341.

444 U.S. at 90, 100 S.

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed because among

other reasons the search was "conducted in a one room bar where
it [was] obvious, that. . .heroin was being sold" and "Ybarra was
not an innocent stranger having no connection with the premises".
Ibid.

The Supreme Court reversed stating:
a person's propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity
does not, without more, give rise to probable
caiuse to search that person.

444 U.S. at 92, 100 S. Ct. at 342. The state attempted to
justify the "frisk for weapons" under the Terry exception but the

11

It is noteworthy that the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, in the case involving the home to which
appellant was headed, suppressed evidence found in a visitor's
car parked within the curtilage of that home for the reason that
the search of that car was outside the scope of the warrant,
United States v. Gottschalk, U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah, Case No. CR 89165, Transcript, Jan. 5, 1990, Addendum A.
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Court held:
The "narrow scope" of the Terrv exception
does not permit a frisk for weapons on less
than reasonable belief or suspicion directed
at the person to be frisked/ even though that
person happens to be on premises where an
authorized narcotics search is taking place.
444 U.S. at 94, 100 S. Ct. at 343.

(Emphasis added).

The

Supreme Court thus required the facts supporting a belief that
Ybarra might be armed derive from facts about Mr. Ybarra not from
what is known about others who might be present to engage in the
narcotics trade.
In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69
L.Ed.2d. 340 (1981), the Court did Hold that the detention of a
person who resided in a home was implicitly authorized by a
warrant for that home.
(Utah

1986) .

Accord, state v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380

However,

in

doing

so,

the

Supreme

Court

distinguished the detention of an occupant from the search of a
visitor for weapons that took place in Ybarra. 452 U.S. at 696,
n. A, 101 S. Ct. at 2590, n. 4.
In the instant case there were no facts concerning appellant
articulated as reasons for his detention other than he was a
person intending to visit one of the homes being searched at
11:50 p.m.

There were no facts concerning appellant articulated

for the search for weapons—it was simply the policy of the
S.W.A.T team to search all persons detained.
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The facts that he

had long hair and looked like a motorcycle person, was driving a
pick-up truck, and appeared startled and his car rolled one or
two feet backward when first stopped were not given as reasons
for the detention by the officer and in any event would not raise
a reasonable fear that he was armed and dangerous.

The other

"facts" concerning the propensity of people engaged in the drug
trade to be armed and to conduct business at night are simply not
transferable to the appellant under Ybarra, supra, and Brown v.
Texas, supra,

(Presence in an alley with high intensity of drug

trafficking not sufficient).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it violated the fourth amendment to
intercept all persons entering the street where homes were being
searched, detain all persons who gave a searched home as their
destination, and search for weapons the persons so detained and
their vehicles.

Accordingly, it was error to deny the motion to

suppress and to admit into evidence the money and contraband
seized without which there could have been no conviction.

This

court should reverse the judgment and sentence of the district
court.
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ADDENDUM A
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IN THE UNITED STATES D I S T R I C T

2

COURT

.. jtf>

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
* ^

3

CENTRAL DIVISION

9

\t^

4
5

355*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

6
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Civil No. CR89-165

7

vs .

8

BRUCE T. GOTTSCHALK,

9

RULING ON MOTION
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Defendant.
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12
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14
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15
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For the United States of America:

Wayne T. Dance, Esq.
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Fred Metos,

Esq,

20
21

I hereby certify that the annexed document Is a true
and correct copy of the original on file in th"s o f ^
ATTEST: MARKUS B. ZIMMER
Clerk, U.S. District Court
District ofJJtah

22
23

By:

24

ueputy Clerk
25

REPORTED BY:

Date:

Kris Remakel,
CSR, RPR, CP
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1

II SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH

JANUARY

2

5
6
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9
10
11
12
13

person.

He is r e p r e s e n t e d

T. D a n c e is h e r e .

16
17
18
19

SESSION

This

we need
relates

to h e a r .

is

and

thinking

that

about

to dismiss and a m o t i o n

the motion

must be g r a n t e d

this m a t t e r .

and

And

to items

I grant

done
I

further

think

I don't

think

to the time that

liming

reading

the m o t i o n

to

itthat

to include a v e h i c l e

to be owned or under

the c o n t r o l

the o w n e r of the p r e m i s e s , in this c a s e , W i l l i a m
And

in

taken out of the C a d i l l a c ,

a search of the premises

the p r e m i s e s , it's got

Wayne

argued

I think in o r d e r for that search w a r r a n t
authorized

in

to s u p p r e s s , as it

in the C a d i l l a c was

time. I have

s u p p r e s s , as it relates

is here

USA

89CR-165W.

Yesterday,

Since

the

by M r . G. Fred Metos and M r .

to the items c o n t a i n e d

before m e .

in the m a t t e r of

And M r . G o t t s c h a l k

W e ' v e got a m o t i o n

14
15

W e are here

versus B r u c e T. G o t t s c h a l k .

7
8

P.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

3
4

5, 1990

the e v i d e n c e e s t a b l i s h e s

of

Bailey.

that at or

that C a d i l l a c was searched,

on

that

prior

it was

under

20
his d o m i n a t i o n

and c o n t r o l , even

though he was

the o w n e r

of

21
the p r e m i s e s and

this

inoperable C a d i l l a c w i t h

the keys

the ignition

the e n g i n e out of it was on his

in

22
and

premises.

23
And

the M a g i s t r a t e

found, and

I affirm,

there

were

24
no exigent

circumstances,

there is no public d a n g e r , and

there

25
was no m e n t i o n

of the C a d i l l a c

in the Affidavit

A -2

in

Support

of the search warrant.
And so, I grant the motion to suppress, and nothing
will be introduced at this trial what was taken from the
Cadillac.

So, now let's go to the motion to dismiss.

now read those motions.
(Conclusion of partial transcript.)
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I have

